Abstract-The search for lightweight authentication protocols suitable for low-cost RFID tags constitutes an active and challenging research area. In this context, a family of protocols based on the LPN problem has been proposed: the so-called HB-family. Despite the rich literature regarding the cryptanalysis of these protocols, there are no published results about the impact of fault analysis over them. The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap by presenting a fault analytic method against a prominent member of the HB-family: HB
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e-mail: {carrijo,tonicelli}@redes.unb.br, andclay@ene.unb.br Manuscript reduced practicality [7] . In 2008, Gilbert et al. [6] presented their protocol version called HB # . This new variant solved many drawbacks of its predecessors. Among them: it is provably secure against GRS-MITM attacks and presents a reduced communication cost. Although HB # represented an evolution in terms of efficiency and security, it was later shown that it is vulnerable to a more general man-in-the middle adversary [13] .
As illustrated in the previous history line, the research community effort has been directed to mitigating active attacks based on a man-in-the-middle setting. Before proceeding further, it is relevant to discuss the practical feasibility of man-inthe-middle attacks against the HB-family. No implementation of such attacks on RFID systems has been reported in the literature yet as it apparently requires a sophisticated hardware device capable of capturing and modifying the tag-reader communications in real-time [14] . In this article, we offer an alternative approach: a simple and effective fault attack that can be applied to a wide collection of HB variants. In contrast to MITM attacks, our approach has already been demonstrated to be feasible in [10] , where implementations of fault analytic techniques over RFID tags have been made with low-cost equipment.
Fault Analysis. Traditional cryptography often assumes that secrets are stored in tamper-proof locations. Under this conventional point of view, cryptographic systems are modeled as black boxes, i.e., as ideal mathematical objects. Nevertheless, cryptographic systems are implemented on physical devices, which present potential side channels not considered by the security models of theoretical cryptography. In this context, fault analysis came into the scene as an alternative approach on gathering secret data.
Fault attacks are focused on attacking the physical implementation of a given cryptosystem, rather than its algorithmic structure. A fault attack relies on the principle that the cryptanalyst is allowed to manipulate the target device and induce it to abnormally operate, making it to output faulty results. These faulty results can later on be used by the cryptanalyst to derive secret information. Depending on the implementation, there are several fault induction techniques that can be deployed over the target device: exposing its surface to focused light beams, provoking variations in its power supply, exposing it to heat or radiation, inducing clock variations, among others.
The introduction of fault analysis by Boneh et al. [3] motivated an extensive research in the field. Since then, fault analysis has been successfully applied to disrupt standard symmetric [2] and asymmetric [1] ciphers. But there are no such results for lightweight authentication protocols, which is the intended goal of the present work.
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Contributions. This paper provides a fault analytic techniques against the HB + protocol. Our objective is to contribute to the specialized literature by offering an alternative perspective in the cryptanalysis of such protocols. The fault attack here proposed presents various advantages over other active attacks: (1) it does not require the eavesdropping of previous authentication procedures, (2) it can be easily adapted to disrupt other HB-variants, (3) technologically, it requires an affordable physical apparatus. Our fault analysis model assumes a great level of control over the cryptographic device. We leave as an open problem the design and application of a weaker fault analytic model. Organization. This paper is organized as follows. In section II, we briefly review the protocol HB + . Section III details the fault analysis model here used. Section IV describes the attacks and section V presents some performance results.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROTOCOLS
Assume that tag and reader communicate by means of a wireless insecure channel and share some piece of secret information. The HB + protocol is as follows:
k-bit secret key pair shared by tag and reader.
⊕, and bitwise XOR and inner product operations.
1) For i = 1 to r a) The reader chooses a random k-bit string a i ∈ {0, 1} k and sends it to the tag. b) The tag chooses a random k-bit string b i ∈ {0, 1} k and sends it to the reader. c) The tag computes z i = a i x ⊕ b i y ⊕ v i . After computing z i , the tag sends it back to the reader. d) The reader computes z * i = a i x ⊕ b i y and compares it to z i .
2) The reader accepts the authentication as valid if z * i = z i in less than ηr rounds. A legitimate tag interacting with a legitimate reader may be rejected with probability P F R (probability of false rejection), and an adversarial structure answering randomly at each round may be accepted with probability P F A (probability of false acceptance). For the HB + protocol, these probabilities are given below:
III. FAULT ANALYSIS MODEL A. Assumed Fault Analysis Assumptions
At first, it is important to differentiate local fault injections from global fault injections. Local fault injections affect only specific regions of the device, while global fault injections affect the entire device. Thus, local fault-injection methods are more precise and can be directed to the specific device's regions that contain sensitive information. Our fault analytic model relies on local fault injections applied to the RFID tag.
In such a fault analysis model, the adversary has physical access to the device and is allowed to run it for several times while provoking faults into chosen memory areas. Specifically, we consider that the adversary is able to apply bit flipping faults to either the RAM or the internal registers of the device. Besides that, he/she can arbitrarily reset the cryptographic device and later induce other randomly chosen faults into it.
Our fault analysis assumptions are the following ones:
• The adversary is allowed to change the content of chosen memory areas to specific values, 0 or 1.
• The adversary is able to run the authentication procedure as many times he/she needs.
• The adversary knows precisely the time the faults are met.
B. On the Possibility of Localized Fault Injections
Since we assume a strong adversarial model, it is important to conjecture about the feasibility of the underlying attack. In this field, significant results have been achieved by Hutter et al. [10] , who offered a detailed analysis about the vulnerabilities of RFID tags to faults.
As previously stated, we assume that the adversary is able to induce faults on specific parts of the device. In [10] , the authors show that it is possible to perform localized fault injections on RFID tags by means of focused laser beams. Their local fault-injection techniques relied on an affordable physical apparatus: an optical microscope equipped with an integrated incident illumination device, and a laser diode mounted on the top of the microscope camera port.
Remarkably, the authors report that the microscope provided the capability of exploring the device's internal structure very accurately. They describe that their method allowed them to interfere data, control lines, memory blocks and driver circuits.
Thus, it is possible to conjecture that our fault analytic model, despite being strong, is not far away from reality.
IV. DESCRIPTION OF THE ATTACK
Our method consists of performing fault insertions into the device and trying to authenticate it on a legitimate reader. Based on the result of the authentication procedure, the cryptanalyst infers the actual value of the modified bit. The inherent beauty of this attack resides in the fact that the adversary is not required to eavesdrop any previous authentication procedures.
Let w denote the memory area that stores the binary string composed by the concatenation of the two secret keys, i.e., w = x||y, such that w ∈ {0, 1} The function HBplusAuthentication(v) denotes the process of trying to authenticate by using a 2k -binary string v. The function HBplusAuthentication(v) returns TRUE if the authentication procedure succeeds, or returns FALSE if the authentication procedure fails.
Algorithm 2 describes the attack on HB + .
Algorithm 2 BreakHBplus(w,q): Compute the two shared secret keys x and y. Require: Memory area w and parameter q ∈ N * . Ensure: The secret key pair (x, y), such that (x, y) ∈ {0, 1} k ×{0, 1} k . The secret key pair is correctly discovered with high probability.
return (x, y)
V. PERFORMANCE RESULTS

A. Information Theoretic Measures
Prior to evaluating the effectiveness of the attack against the protocol HB + , we shall define some information theoretic quantities that will be useful in our analysis. Particularly, we are interested in two tasks: (1) quantifying the correlation between the key stored in the device and the key extracted by the attacker and (2) characterizing the level of information leaked by executing the underlying cryptanalytic method.
Let X and Y be discrete random variables defined over finite alphabets X and Y, respectively. The definitions are as follow:
The entropy of X can be visualized as the amount of uncertainty contained in it and is given by:
Loosely speaking, the equivocation of X given Y measures the amount of remaining uncertainty on X given that Y is known. Its definition is given next:
The mutual information between X and Y measures the correlation between them and is defined as:
Additionally,
B. Results
Probability of Failure.
In the first place, we shall calculate the probability of committing an error when retrieving a single bit of a shared secret key. This probability of error can be trivially derived. Lemma 1: Let w ∈ {0, 1} 2k denote a uniformly distributed secret key stored in a RFID tag, and let w q ∈ {0, 1} 2k denote the key guessed by an attacker who executesueries to the device. The probability of error, i.e., the probability of retrieving the bit w q [i] = b when the actual bit is w[i] = b, is given by:
Proof: Initially, we obtain the probability of error when one single query (q = 1) is executed by the attacker.
In this case, the adversary injects a zero into the position w[i]. Consequently, the attacker's action did not alter the value of the stored secret key and the tag remains valid. An error occurs if the reader rejects the tag.
After the fault injection, the value of the stored secret key is modified, and the tag is no longer valid. Consequently, the reader is expected to reject the tag. An error occurs if the reader authenticates the tag.
In the next step we calculate the probability of error when an arbitrary number q of queries is executed, which is given by:
q−i Figure 2 shows the graphic of p = f (η, r). We may conclude that the more reliable is the authentication procedure, the more reliable is the fault analytic method. Furthermore, it is easily observable that P e (q) asymptotically goes to zero for sufficiently large q. 
Information Leakage.
We analyze the effectiveness of the attack by using the definitions in section V-A. We also empirically demonstrate that P e (q) approaches zero for a sufficiently large number of queries.
One can see that the process of extracting one isolated bit of the secret key is analogous to the process of transmitting a single bit over a binary symmetric channel (BSC) with crossover probability p(η, r). Let h(p) = −p log p − (1 − p) log(1 − p) denote the binary entropy function, for the specific case where the key is uniformly distributed, we have that H(w[i] |w q [i]) = h(P e (q)) and I w[i]; w q [i] = 1 − h(P e (q)). 
